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ABSTRACT 
 
Enterprise Resource Planning (ERP) system implementation projects are notoriously risky. While large-scale ERP cases 
continue to be developed, relatively few new ERP cases have been published that further ERP implementation education in 
small to medium size firms. This case details the implementation of a new ERP system in a medium sized manufacturing firm. 
As students explore the case, they will be required to address the many ERP-related project management, procurement, human 
resource, and management involvement issues raised by it. This case highlights the ERP implementation problems 
experienced by case company in one of their two divisions. The firm is considering whether or not to implement this same 
ERP system in its other division. Before proceeding, the firm‟s board of directors has concluded that a review of the first 
division ERP implementation is needed. They believe that such an assessment could provide valuable insight and lessons 
learned, giving rise to improvement of the second division‟s ERP implementation outcome.  
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
Enterprise Resource Planning (ERP) system implementation 
projects are notoriously risky. Failure rates for ERP projects 
have consistently been reported as very high (Aloini, 
Dulmin, Mininno, 2007; Kwahk and Lee, 2008). About 90% 
of ERP implementations are late or over budget (Martin, 
1998), and the success rate of ERP systems implementation 
is only about 33% (Zhang et al., 2003). In response, today‟s 
IS curriculum has expanded to emphasize the need for 
improved ERP technical skills, the integration of ERP team 
knowledge, and the acquisition of greater overall business 
knowledge (Boyle and Strong, 2006). However, serious 
deficiencies remain in ERP related project management, 
procurement, human resource, and top management 
education (Chen, Law, and Yang, 2009; Davis and Comeau, 
2004; Du, Johnson, and Keil, 2004; Smith, Sarkusky, and 
Corrigall, 2008).  In addition, a renewed emphasis on top 
management involvement in ERP implementation has been 
identified as an important topic for IS education (Liang, 
Saraf, Hu, and Xue, 2007; Ifinedo, 2008).  
The impact of firm size on ERP implementation success 
clearly requires greater study. Our review of ERP case 
research indicates that prior studies have traditionally 
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focused on major ERP vendors targeting sales efforts toward 
large firms. Examples for such research are: the case study of 
implementation of ERP to reengineer the business processes 
of a major manufacturer (Al-Mashari and Al-Mudimigh, 
2003); discussion of the factors that lead to the success or 
failure of ERP on large construction firms (Voordijk et al., 
2003). At many universities this has led to the development 
of an IS curricula that is biased toward large-scale vendors, 
such as SAP. As the large-scale ERP market has matured, 
vendors have increasingly retargeted their sale of ERP 
software toward medium and small size firms. While large-
scale ERP cases continue to be developed, relatively few 
new ERP cases have been published that further ERP 
implementation education in small to medium size firms 
(Winkelmann and Leyh, 2010). 
This case is about the implementation of a new ERP 
system in a medium sized manufacturing firm. As students 
explore the case they will be required to address the many 
ERP related project management, procurement, human 
resource, and management involvement issues raised by it. 
This case highlights the ERP implementation problems 
experienced by Custom Engineering Solutions (CES), 
including senior management‟s role, in its Electronic Control 
Systems (ECS) division. The firm is considering whether or 
not to implement this same ERP system in its 
Electromechanical Motors & Equipment (EME) division. 
Before proceeding, CES‟ board of directors has concluded 
that a review of the ECS ERP implementation is needed. 
They believe that such an assessment could provide valuable 
insight and lessons learned that could improve EME‟s 
implementation outcome.  
 
2. COMPANY BACKGROUND 
 
Custom Engineering Solutions (CES) is an engineering 
services company specializing in custom electronic industrial 
controls and the remanufacture of heavy, electro-mechanical 
industrial equipment. It was initially formed after World War 
II to repair and rewire large electric motors used in a wide 
range of sophisticated applications, including industrial 
machinery, generators, and aircraft engines for example.  
The founder, who was a mechanical engineer, grew their 
business by delivering custom engineering services to local 
companies of various sizes.  In the past decade, global 
companies have come to demand CES‟ products and 
services, especially its electronic industrial controls. As it 
has grown, it has begun to source assemblies required for 
production from Ireland and China.   
Currently, CES produces approximately 1,500 different 
active products, with a mix of around 300 of these products 
and on average 3,600 units shipped to its customers every 
month.  Their sales are distributed through 8-10 wholesalers, 
and a few of them are large national distributors with 
significant bargaining power. For example, Power Mason in 
St. Paul Minnesota is one of their largest distributors.  
Additionally, CES also sells directly to 50 regular customers.  
Sales are also seasonal and thin-out during economic 
downturns. Production must be ramped-up and down for 
these seasonal peaks and valleys.  Hence, the company both 
builds to stock and to customer orders. 
CES has two major divisions. Its oldest division, 
Electromechanical Motors & Equipment (EME) is also its 
largest division, representing approximately 75% of CES‟ 
sales revenues. Its youngest division, Electronic Control 
Systems (ECS), manufactures semi-custom electronic 
control systems featuring user-configurable control panel 
hardware and customer-specific software modifications. 
CES‟ EME division can best be characterized as a 
remanufacturer of low-tech, electromechanical industrial 
equipment. In contrast, its ECS division can best be 
characterized as a manufacturer of new, high-tech, custom 
electronic control systems. 
As CES has grown, it has found differences between its 
two divisions‟ business models have created significant 
management problems. From an operational perspective, 
these differences are evident in the way each division has 
utilized CES‟ manufacturing control system in the past.  The 
EME division primarily utilizes maintenance bills of material 
(BOMs) designed to provide a skeleton set of material, labor, 
and machine requirements created based on the past history 
for jobs of a similar type. They are then modified extensively 
to support the remanufacturing effort and to estimate cost, 
profit, and price. Each job is essentially custom and unique 
to the machine, generator, or power system being 
refurbished.  
In contrast, the ECS division has traditionally developed 
bills of materials for most new products, which are then 
modified as necessary to create different product 
configuration options to meet customer orders. However, 
instead of using a more conventional, APICS (The 
Association for Operations Management) standard approach 
to address this BOM flexibility requirement, CES has created 
unique product numbers for each customer order by copying 
a standard product BOM, then adding custom components 
and routing steps.  This resulted in many thousands of 
“dead” BOM product variations saved in its manufacturing 
control system due to one time or limited run production 
orders. These many variants would return to haunt ECS in its 
future ERP implementation effort, because they greatly 
increased the complexity of the eventual data conversion 
process. 
In addition, the operational differences between 
divisions created significant CES cost management and 
control problems. First, the accuracy of the price quotations 
for the EME division depended on the skill and experience 
of the sales managers responsible for pricing actions. The 
existing manufacturing control system, combined with 
EME‟s current approach to job cost estimation, made it 
difficult to accurately estimate and track the time and cost of 
a job.  Thus, one need CES had was to implement a better, 
more automated system of analyzing prior jobs to help quote 
on new work. 
Second, the ECS division‟s approach of modifying 
standard product BOMs to create many custom products 
caused problems because this customization of standard 
products was not captured in labor and materials reporting. 
While it built semi-custom products, the current 
manufacturing control system did not capture these costs by 
job at the point they were incurred.  Instead, CES‟ approach 
was to back flush costs based on standards, not utilizing the 
factory data collection and inventory control capabilities to 
capture actual production costs. This meant that cost 
variances were incorrectly calculated based on a standard 
versus “as built” basis. As such, it is not possible to assess 
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whether production costs are accurate, much less conduct 
any sort of valid cost variance analysis. 
 
3. ERP SYSTEM JUSTIFICATION 
 
3.1 The Need for New Systems 
The need for new information systems eventually became 
clear to CES‟ senior management. Using the old systems it 
was no longer possible to gain a firm grip on product and 
service costs. The accuracy of the data and reporting was 
questionable and of significant concern to the senior 
management. On the factory floor, controlling production 
jobs was increasingly difficult with parts, materials, and 
finished goods inventory inaccuracies. In addition, true 
production capacity and job progress was unclear at best.  
 
3.2 Justifications for a New ERP System 
When CES‟ senior management finally decided to act, they 
chose to do so for several reasons. These reasons were 
outlined in detail by the CFO who revealed the following 
three justifications for CES‟ purchase of a new ERP system 
to external consultants. 
 
3.2.1 Support niche market strategy: First, it was evident 
that CES could no longer compete on price when going 
head-to-head against large competitors on most standard type 
products and services. Due to scale economies, larger 
competitors could always submit a “low ball” price quote 
that CES could not match.  However, on semi-custom and 
custom products and services that are low volume or unique 
by larger competitors‟ standards, CES could compete 
profitably. This was a market niche in which they have done 
well in the past. Their unique, remanufacturing capabilities 
and new, semi-custom manufacturing capabilities and niche 
products should remain their focus. Therefore, the 
replacement of their outdated systems with a new ERP 
system capable of supporting this environment was 
imperative. 
 
3.2.2 Provide better cost data: Second, while CES cannot 
challenge competitors on price, it must be prepared to 
compete on cost when customers and the market dictate final 
price.   CES must be capable of managing its costs to satisfy 
customer requirements profitably.  The new ERP system 
must therefore provide better cost data for CES to be capable 
of pricing remanufactured products and new product sales to 
remain profitable.  Improved cost reporting is considered to 
be imperative to CES‟ future survival. 
 
3.2.3 Improve the accuracy of financial reporting: Third, 
and perhaps most important, CES was under pressure from 
its external investors and bank(s) to improve the accuracy of 
its financial reporting, especially in the area of cost 
management and inventory valuation.  Related to this, its 
auditors have stepped up their demands due to pressure on 
accounting firms to improve the quality of their audits. CES‟ 
old systems did not provide the necessary detail and clarity 
required, or the financial controls to satisfy external parties.  
Hence, management had no option but to act and to do so 
soon to avoid negative consequences initiated by the external 
parties. 
 
3.2.4 Other justifications: There were other, supporting 
justifications as well. For example, these included: 1) 
streamlining their value chain so that inventory is not carried 
at multiple locations, 2) better tracking of sales and the flow 
of jobs through production, 3) improved sales forecasting, 
and 4) the implementation of a web store. An interesting side 
note is that these justifications for the new ERP system were 
not revealed in full to middle management during the system 
selection and implementation process.  In particular, the 
pressure from external sources was not revealed, although it 
may have been the most significant justification for 
proceeding rapidly with introducing an ERP system. 
 
4. ERP SYSTEM ACQUISTION 
 
The ERP system evaluation process took place in two 
phases. First, a team of four senior managers contacted ERP 
software vendors, collected information, and narrowed the 
list of potential vendors down to a smaller subset. This senior 
management team included the CFO, COO, and the two sons 
of the company founder. The two sons of the founder are 
also the presidents of the two divisions. One criteria used by 
senior management to solicit ERP vendors was known to be 
the size of vendors‟ implementation base within the industry. 
However, beyond this criterion little else is known about 
how vendors were solicited to participate in the bidding 
process.  
Second, senior management‟s primary goal was to 
choose an ERP system that most closely satisfied the needs 
of the EME division, not the ECS division.  As was stated 
previously, EME is the larger division, representing 
approximately 75% of CES‟ sales revenues. ECS is the 
smaller division, representing approximately 25% of CES‟ 
annual revenues. Therefore, even though ECS was chosen as 
the first site for the ERP implementation, the requirements of 
ECS were considered to be secondary. 
In developing the ERP selection criteria, members of the 
senior management team met with the various user groups to 
become familiar with the functions and features being used 
in CES‟ current systems. After doing so, they developed a 
short list of ERP software vendors, asked these firms to 
present their system‟s features, and extended an RFQ to bid 
on the job. Three potential vendors were then selected to 
give formal proposals to the management team.  
At the conclusion of the process, an ERP system 
developed by Epicor (http://www.epicor.com) was 
purchased for $250,000. The final ERP software selection 
decision was made by the CFO in conjunction with the COO. 
The firm‟s IT manager was allowed little input, and was all 
but excluded from the decision process. Likewise, the firm‟s 
middle and line managers were allowed limited input and did 
not participate in the final decision. While Epicor‟s ERP 
software was chosen for implementation, CES‟ senior 
management team concluded that the software vendor‟s 
services were simply too expensive for CES to engage them 
to support the system implementation process. Epicor was 
also deemed as “not being flexible enough” to help CES 
meet its desired, accelerated go-live date.  
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5. PROJECT MANAGEMENT ISSUES 
 
There are a number of significant issues surrounding the 
management of this project. First, Epicor‟s ERP system was 
selected and the project approved in November 2007 with an 
initial “go live” implementation date, set by the CFO, of July 
1st, 2008. ECS employees were given just six months to 
install the software, convert (and cleanup) the data, test the 
system, and train the employees using ECS‟ data. However, 
ECS did not actually begin work on the data conversion and 
testing effort until early April of 2008. When asked later, the 
CFO stated that the initial implementation date was fair and 
that individuals such as the IT manager were simply making 
excuses for not starting and completing their work on time. 
Second, from the start it was not clear who the project 
manager was. The CFO stated that he assigned the IT 
manager to be the project manager. However, while the IT 
manager was assigned responsibility for the project‟s 
successful implementation, he was given no decision making 
authority. All decisions, no matter how small, were to be 
approved by the CFO. While the IT manager had a Masters 
degree in project management, he was not allowed to 
develop a detailed plan using tools such as PERT or CPM 
that could have shown that the desired final implementation 
date was not feasible due to insufficient time, money, and 
manpower resources.  The CFO simply stated they would 
successfully implement the new ERP system on the desired 
completion date. The IT manager and other project team 
members simply needed to work harder to get the 
implementation done on time. 
Third, as was stated previously, the tasks and 
dependencies between tasks were never articulated in a clear 
project plan. While Epicor provided a 126 step project 
planning process, CES chose not to follow it closely.  Rather, 
it managed the project via short, very general lists of 12-15 
tasks. ECS did not identify a critical path of tasks or perform 
key resource projections. Task or resource dependencies 
were only addressed when they became critical, which 
happened frequently. Finally, while the CEO set a “drop 
dead” implementation date and CFO stood firm with the date 
set by CEO, the implementation team did not conduct any 
sort of backward scheduling exercise to determine if 
implementation was feasible.  
Fourth, like the IT manager, the middle and line 
managers were told the implementation date was fixed and 
were given little decision making authority.  From a 
manpower perspective, the CFO resisted requests from ECS 
division managers to release employees from their existing 
duties to work on the project. When it became clear that the 
implementation deadline could not be met without adding 
significant resources, the CFO continued to dictate that no 
extra money or resources would be provided. His solution 
was to implement mandatory overtime. As the economy 
worsened and the project bogged down, CES proceeded to 
layoff key personnel who had been supporting the project, 
further straining the remaining project resources.  Few 
employees complained as good manufacturing related jobs 
were in short supply.  
Fifth, the total project budget had been set at $500,000 
by the CFO.  When asked how he developed this estimate, 
the CFO responded that he had based his project budget on 
the purchase cost of the Epicor ERP software. Since the ERP 
software had cost $250,000 he reasoned that the total IT 
implementation costs for both divisions should not exceed 
the software‟s initial purchase cost. While the CFO had been 
told by Epicor, by other Epicor ERP client firms, and by 
various ERP consultants that the implementation cost could 
greatly exceed the CFO‟s estimate, he dismissed their cost 
projections as greatly exaggerated.  
 
6. SYSTEM IMPLEMENTATION 
 
In small and medium enterprises (SME), the senior 
management team including the CFO and COO play a 
critical role in setting the tone from the top for a new system 
and its use.  However, users‟ existing knowledge set, prior 
training, professional norms, expectations, and beliefs affect 
their actions that influence the implementation and training 
costs related to the new system, which together with the cost 
of the software make up the total cost of ownership of an 
ERP system (Busco, 2009).  In SMEs, given the power 
distance in the hierarchical structure, users‟ reaction to a new 
system implementation and use often takes the form of 
passive resistance to change existing processes and non-
engagement with the new system.  For a variety of reasons, 
users‟ concerns may be ignored, that leading to many 
implementation problems.  
In configuring its new ERP system, CES made several 
setup errors that would significantly impact it later. For 
example, it was a major mistake to setup two different 
companies rather than setup two separate divisions within 
the same company. By itself, this mistake created a host of 
data integration problems. One such problem was that the 
interdivisional transfer of finished goods or inventory was 
now required to be treated as external sales versus a simple 
internal company transfer between divisions.  
Data conversion between the old system and the new 
system almost proved to ECS‟ undoing during the 
implementation. Because much of the data in the old system 
was obsolete or no longer used, it was necessary to first 
purge this data before converting it to the new system. For 
example, during the data conversion 170,000 obsolete part 
numbers and their associated routings were purged. The data 
was first exported to Excel from the old system, the obsolete 
data removed, and the remaining data revised to include 
additional attributes needed by the Epicor ERP system. 
Macros were written to make many revisions, but an audit of 
this process was not conducted that would have allowed ECS 
to detect and correct many errors. 
The users had only been trained using vendor supplied 
test data. There was no testing or training using ECS data 
before the go-live date.  Hence, users had little opportunity 
to learn the new system and to identify and point out flaws in 
the data conversions.  Because most employees were doing 
this work in addition to their existing job, many avoided 
getting involved in the data conversion effort, hence, 
important tasks were missed.  For example, data critical to 
product cost buildups was either not input or was not input 
correctly. In addition, users were not trained to create 
reports. Because of the lack of training and little 
understanding of the new system, the users were expecting 
the new system to produce reports that looked similar to 
those generated by the old system. Most did not realize that 
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they would need to use tools such as Crystal Reports to 
create their own reports. 
The impact of poor project planning soon became 
visible. While there had been milestones for training and 
data conversion (i.e. clean the data), and for importing the 
data, key “go/no-go” decisions were not made by the 
management team.  Typically, at weekly meeting users were 
asked whether they got things done, and if they were not 
done, they were told to get it done next week.  Consequently, 
there were many moving targets that required continuous 
attention as ECS approached the „go-live‟ date.   
Fortunately, customers had been informed to expect 
delays because of the changeover to the new system, and 
most customers were very understanding.  However, the 
anticipated three month implementation soon stretched out 
another three months. By six months, ECS realized that their 
ERP system was not working properly. At one point ECS‟ 
product returns reached 40% of sales due to incorrect 
configurations or quality problems. It took a consulting firm 
another three months to fix the data problems. Thus, during 
the first 9 months of system use, most users reverted to 
manual, pencil and paper forms or Excel spreadsheets to 
control inventory, schedule and track production, and 
perform most business tasks. It was also almost impossible 
to accurately track and calculate product costs, a key 
justification for the new system. 
The pressure to have the system go live by the top 
management by the pre-set date, the lack of effective project 
management during implementation, and errors in importing 
the data all led to employees‟ resistance in using the new 
ERP system.  Eventually, the system was implemented 
because of “sheer brute force” from the top, and the ERP 
project teams worked hard to make it happen.  The 
employees‟ attitudes changed gradually and most used on-
line training to become proficient users.  They continue to 
have weekly meetings where they discuss what has to be 
done to complete the project implementation.    
 
7. THE IT MANAGERS  
 
As was stated earlier, the CFO had determined that the total 
ERP implementation budget for both divisions was to be 
$500,000. This included $250,000 to purchase the software 
and $250,000 to conduct the implementation process. This 
budget for the implementation process was split with 
$100,000 allocated for ECS and $150,000 for the EME 
division respectively. The CFO stated that he withheld this 
information from the IT manager, instead informing him that 
he had a budget of $100,000 to implement the ERP system 
for both divisions.  His explanation was, “I expected the IT 
manager to show leadership to implement the ERP system at 
ECS for significantly less than the $100,000 budgeted for the 
first division.”  
In the end, the IT implementation costs for ECS were 
$90,000, effectively leaving only a $10,000 budget for 
implementing the system at the larger EME division.  Hence, 
the CFO stated “the IT manager had failed to control costs 
effectively.” In the fall of 2008 the CFO terminated the IT 
manager and in November of 2008, a second IT manager 
was hired. The second IT manager had a Masters in CIS and 
extensive MIS experience. However, he soon fell out of 
favor with the CFO. When asked about the project plan, he 
stated that, “management does not appear to believe it is 
important to do the upfront planning work”. CES is currently 
seeking its fourth IT manager within a three year period. 
In addition, four different consultants were engaged by 
the CFO. One consultant hired by the CFO was deemed to be 
“not capable” because of the lack of knowledge in 
manufacturing, and he was not considered an effective 
change leader.  Another consultant performed training but 
was not considered effective because he could not teach 
users with ECS company data. Another was hired to advise 
management regarding the best approach to solve its 
implementation problems. They were considered not to have 
provided reasonable solutions. The CFO then hired another 
consulting firm to cleanup system data when internal users 
could not identify problems and complete the work. 
 
8. FINAL COMMENTS 
 
After two years, most users reported they were using the 
ERP system as the information outputs improved. However, 
significant reporting requirements have still not been met 
and important system features are not being utilized. When 
asked to rate their satisfaction with the Epicor ERP 
implementation, ECS users reported an average score of 1 or 
2 on a 5 point scale (1=Very Low, 3=Neutral, 5=Very High). 
When asked this same question, the CFO reported that he 
would rate his satisfaction as being at least a 4 or 5.  
 
9. QUESTIONS FOR DISCUSSION 
 
The CES board of directors must now decide how it should 
proceed. You are to answer the following questions as if you 
are responding to question raised by the board. 
1. Was the CFO‟s justification for the need for a new ERP 
system sound? If yes, state specifically why. If not, state 
why not, making sure to highlight the flaws in his 
justification.  Your answer should also highlight the role 
accounting must play for an ERP systems 
implementation project to be successful.   
2. Assume that the CES board of directors has asked you 
to examine the ERP system implementation process.  
Please identify:  
2.1. Business issues related to ERP system 
implementation;  
2.2. Organizational issues related to ERP system 
implementation. What would be the best practices 
for handling those issues? 
3. Assume that the CES board of directors has stated that 
it will setup a project management office (PMO). From 
the issues related to project management process with 
the ECS division ERP implementation, specify actions 
that should be taken related to project management 
process to ensure the success of the EME division‟s 
ERP implementation. 
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